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Abstract—Contact tracing is of paramount importance when
it comes to preventing the spreading of infectious diseases.
Contact tracing is usually performed manually by authorized
personnel. Manual contact tracing is an inefficient, error-prone,
time-consuming process of limited utility to the population at
large as those in close contact with infected individuals are
informed hours, if not days, later. This paper introduces an
alternative way to manual contact tracing. The proposed Smart
Contact Tracing (SCT) system utilizes the smartphones Bluetooth
Low Energy (BLE) signals and machine learning classifier to
accurately and quickly determined the contact profile. SCTs
contribution is two-fold: a) classification of the users contact
as high/low-risk using precise proximity sensing, and b) user
anonymity using a privacy-preserving communications protocol.
SCT leverages BLEs non-connectable advertising feature to
broadcast a signature packet when the user is in the public
space. Both broadcasted and observed signatures are stored in
the users smartphone and they are only uploaded to a secure
signature database when a user is confirmed by public health
authorities to be infected. Using received signal strength (RSS)
each smartphone estimates its distance from other users phones
and issues real-time alerts when social distancing rules are
violated. The paper includes extensive experimentation utilizing
real-life smartphone positions and a comparative evaluation of
five machine learning classifiers. Reported results indicate that
a decision tree classifier outperforms other states of the art
classification methods in terms of accuracy. Lastly, to facilitate
research in this area, and to contribute to the timely development
of advanced solutions the entire data set of six experiments with
about 123,000 data points is made publicly available.
Index Terms—Bluetooth Low Energy, Smartphone, COVID-19,
Physical Distancing, Proximity, Contact Tracing
I. INTRODUCTION
CONTACT tracing is an important step in containing adisease outbreak [1], [2]. Many efforts have been devoted
to tracing a list of contacts when a person is diagnosed with
a highly infectious disease, such as COVID-19. The current
contact tracing method, which requires a collaborative effort
from several authorized personnel, is labor-intensive and time-
consuming [3]. Since it takes time to trace the contact, the
group of users who have been in contact with an infected
individual might spread the disease to another group of people
before they get informed. It is critical to have an effective
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Fig. 1: Smart Contact Tracing (SCT) system that uses non-
connectable BLE transmission to periodically broadcast a constantly-
changing signature packet.
contact tracing method that not only can automatically inform
the potential users immediately but also reducing the required
amount of labor force [4].
To this end, a smart contact tracing (SCT) system is intro-
duced by exploiting the Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) signals
on smartphones. BLE is ubiquitous and is readily available
on many smartphones making it ideal for the introduced
system [5]. On the other hand, smartphones have become an
intimate device in our everyday life. While we might leave
the smartphone away from us when we are in our private
space (e.g., home, private office, etc.), we always carry the
smartphone when we do the grocery shopping, commute on
public transport, walk along the open street, etc. In this way,
smartphones are the best choice for contact tracing, in which
the tracing is only performed when the user is in the public
space. An overall illustration of our introduced SCT system
is shown in Fig. 1. At any time, no location or any other
information regarding the users is collected or transmitted.
The application uses only BLE signals and no information
exchange. The system has three main objectives: preserve-
privacy, provide accurate contact tracing, and provide real-time
proximity alerts.
Preserve- privacy. We leverage the beaconing feature in
BLE wireless technology to broadcast an encrypted packet
periodically [6]. This encrypted packet is broadcast on the non-
connectable advertising channels (i.e., CH 37, 38, and 39).
Hence, our proposed SCT system can prevent unauthorized
access to the user’s smartphone. Furthermore, the packet
encrypts a piece of unique signature information based on the
ambient environmental features the smartphone encountered
at a particular time. This signature is unique and is almost
impossible to be duplicated by another device on another
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2occasion. All the broadcast signatures and observed signatures
will be stored in the local storage. The user is only required to
upload their own broadcast signatures to the signature database
when the user is confirmed to be infected with the contagious
disease. Otherwise, the signature store in the local storage will
be deleted automatically when it is expired. We define the
signature expiration according to the disease spreading time
window, as suggested by the health authorities. By comparing
the signature of each smartphone, a list of possible contacts
can be retrieved without explicitly revealing the sensitive
information of the infected user.
Accurate contact tracing. The smartphone application iden-
tifies contacts in proximity, over time. It records the estimated
distance and the duration of interaction between individuals.
In this way, it will identify when someone has been too close
to an infected person for too long (the too close for too long
(TC4TL) problem). For instance, when people hug each other
they are too close for a short period of time, while inside
the cabin of a flight, people can be in ten meters distance
for too long, breathing the same air. At the same time, a
distance of two meters in a classroom might be safe while
three meters in a subway train might trigger an alert. We have
to rely heavily on the virologists and the epidemiologists to
identify the healthy distance in different environments, and
through this application, we can give them access to these
crucial details.
Real-time proximity alerts. The application will provide a
real-time alert to the user if the physical distancing between
any two users is not maintained. This will be achieved by
detecting the proximity between any users in a given location,
including the grocery store, public transit, etc. This proximity
information can be retrieved by inspecting the RSS patterns
from the user’s smartphone [7]. A smartphone can measure
the RSS value upon seeing the packet broadcast by the nearby
smartphone. Since RSS is inversely proportional to the square
of the distance [8], we can use it to estimate the distance
between any two smartphones and then classify the proximity
based on the recommended physical distancing rule.
Precise distance estimation through the RSS is necessary to
determine the proximity between any two smartphones. How-
ever, RSS is subject to severe fluctuation especially the body
shadowing effect since the smartphone is carried by users [9].
We examine five machine learning-based classifiers: decision
tree (DT), linear discriminant analysis (LDA), naive bayes
(NB), k nearest neighbors (kNN), and support vector machine
(SVM), over six different smartphone positions: Hand-to-Hand
(HH), Hand-to-Pocket (HP), Hand-to-Backpack (HB), Pocket-
to-Backpack (PB), Pocket-to-Pocket (PP), and Backpack-to-
Backpack (BB).
In summary, this paper has the following contributions:
• Privacy-preserving signature protocol: our SCT system
provides a secure contact tracing by using the non-
connectable advertising channels and an encrypted packet
containing unique signature information based on the am-
bient environmental features observed by a smartphone.
• Proximity sensing and real-time physical distance alert,
with precise distance estimation: we classify the prox-
imity of a user to any user by estimating the distance
between any two users based on the RSS values measured
by each smartphone, while we push a notification to alert
the users when anyone violates the physical distancing
rule. After approximately 10 s of interaction between
smartphones, the system is able to provide a reliable
estimation. DL is the most accurate classifier.
• Smartphone implementation and effects of smartphone’s
position: we prototyped our system design and im-
plemented the application in modern smartphones to
demonstrate the feasibility of our proposed SCT. The
energy requirements of the application are negligible.
We compared the classifiers in terms of their estimation
accuracy, while we examine six different positioning sets
of smartphones. When the users have their smartphones
in similar positions, the classifiers can improve accuracy.
• Extensive experiments: we performed extensive exper-
iments in a real-world setting verify the effectiveness
of our SCT. All the collected data is available in the
IEEE Dataport [10] and Github [11]. The overall dataset
contains the measurement data obtained from six experi-
mental sets, amounting to a total of 123,718 data points.
We believe that the dataset will serve as an invaluable
resource for researchers in this field, accelerating the
development of contact tracing applications.
II. BACKGROUND, MOTIVATION AND COMPONENTS
Contact tracing aims to track down a group of users who
have encountered with an infected individual. The goal is to
inform this group of users regarding the potential risk that
they might face so that they can take appropriate actions as
recommended by the local health authority.
A. Current Development in Contact Tracing
Contact tracing could be a viable solution in resuming the
normal lifestyle while preventing the further virus outbreak.
An illustration of the differences in having a contact trac-
ing system is shown in Fig. 2. In practice, a person will
be quarantined immediately when they are confirmed to be
infected with the disease. However, those people who have
been in close contact with the infected individual are still
free to move without realizing that they may have already got
infected and became a virus carrier. With contact tracing, we
can inform most of the potential close contact so that they can
take appropriate action to isolate themselves from the crowd.
Recognizing the importance of contact tracing, many coun-
tries have put effort to develop a smartphone-based contact
tracing system.
• China: In China, a close contact detector based on QR
codes technology is implemented [12]. The application is
developed based on a surveillance strategy in monitoring
the people’s movement within the country and it can push
an alert to users if they have been in close contact with
the infected individual.
• South Korea: In South Korea, the location data (i.e.,
the GPS data) obtained from the user’s smartphone are
used to detect the distance of the users from the infected
individual. The tracker application will push a notification
3quarantine quarantine
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quarantine quarantine
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Fig. 2: Spread of an infectious disease: (a) only quarantine the
infected individual, (b) quarantine the infected individual and all the
users who have been in contact with the infected individual.
that contains the personal details of the infected individ-
uals to the potential users who have been in contact with
the infected individual [13].
• Singapore: In Singapore, a privacy-preserving approach
is adopted, by using the BLE signal on the smartphone
to detect the proximity between any two individuals.
The TraceTogether application broadcasts an encrypted
packet, which is generated by a secret key distributed by
the Ministry of Health, given the phone number [14]. The
application will also alert the users when they are in close
contact with the infected individual.
The first two approaches might compromise user’s privacy
since their applications require to monitor the user’s mobility
and locations. On the other hand, in the third approach,
although it preserves privacy by tracking only the proxim-
ity between users without explicit location information, the
encryption process involves the user’s phone number. Hence,
the phone number might be retrieved by a malicious hacker.
Besides the national-level effort, there are collaborations in
industry and academia in delivering an effective contact tracing
solution while preserving user privacy [15], [16]. Rather than
using location data, many of these initiatives focus on the
use of BLE signals for proximity detection. For instance,
Pan European Privacy-Preserving Proximity Tracing (PEPP-
PT) detects the proximity based on the broadcast BLE packet
containing a full anonymous ID [17]. COVID-19 Watch, on
the other hand, can automatically alert the user when they
are in contact with the infected individual [18]. Similarly, the
Privacy-Preserving Automated Contact Tracing (PACT) ex-
ploits the BLE signals in combination with secure encryption
to detect possible contacts while protecting privacy [19].
Most of the above initiatives assume that the BLE signals
will work for proximity detection without considering the
smartphone positioning effects on it. To the best of our
knowledge, there is a lack of a comprehensive study on
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Fig. 3: The advertising packet can take up to 47 bytes however, the
available bytes for the actual payload is only 31 bytes.
the accuracy of BLE signals for contact tracing proximity
sensing. Furthermore, most of the encryption methods are
based on information provided by the user, which might be
subject to possible information leaks if the encryption method
is compromised. To bridge the gap, this paper studies the
proximity sensing with the BLE signals broadcast from the
smartphones carried by the user while designing a privacy-
preserving signature protocol that uses the environmental
feature instead of user information for packet broadcasting.
Six experimental sets, with different smartphone positioning
are examined, to investigate the feasibility of the system under
different realistic conditions.
B. Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) Technology
BLE provides a short-range communication over the
2.4 GHz ISM band [20]. It is ubiquitous and has been
adopted by many smart devices (e.g., smartwatches, earphones,
smart thermostats, etc.) as the main communication plat-
form [21]. Furthermore, BLE is readily available in most
modern smartphones regardless of the operating system. There
are two modes of communication available with BLE: 1) non-
connectable advertising, and 2) connectable advertising [22].
The latter advertising mode allows another device to request
a connection by sending a CONNECT REQ packet on the
advertising channels. In this work, we focus on the non-
connectable advertising mode, in which the device cannot
accept any incoming connection requests. This feature is useful
for our SCT system in ensuring no neighboring devices can
access the smartphone to retrieve sensitive information. For
contact tracing purposes, we configure the smartphone to
periodically broadcast the advertising packet via the non-
connectable advertising mode. These packets can be heard and
received by any nearby smartphones as long as these smart-
phones are within the broadcast range. These smartphones can
also measure the received signal strength (RSS) upon receiving
the packet.
However, there are two major challenges: 1) the length of
the advertising packet is only up to 47 bytes, and 2) the RSS
values are subject to severe fluctuation.
1) Advertising Packet: In the non-connectable advertising
mode, the smartphone will broadcast the advertising packet
over the three advertising channels periodically according to
the system-defined advertising interval, Ta. The advertising
interval defines how frequent a packet is broadcast. For
example, if Ta = 100 ms, we shall expect to see at least
10 packets per second. The advertising packet can take up to
47 bytes, as shown in Fig. 3. Note that 16 bytes are used for
preamble (1 byte), access address (4 bytes), header (2 bytes),
MAC address (6 bytes), and CRC (3 bytes). Hence, there are
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Fig. 4: The variation of RSS values in different environments.
only 31 bytes left to put in the information related to the envi-
ronmental signature. This poses a question on how to construct
a unique yet useful signature that can be encapsulated into this
31 bytes payload.
2) Received Signal Strength (RSS): Following the inverse
square law [23], the RSS is inversely proportional to the square
of the distance. Let Pr denotes the signal strength in dBm,
then:
Pr ∝ 1
dn
(1)
where d is the distance between any two devices and n
is the path loss exponent, and its value is subject to the
environmental setting when the measurement is taken. As
shown in Fig. 4, different environments have different effects
on the RSS variation even though the distance between any
two devices in these environments are the same. Hence, we
need to take the environmental factor into consideration when
applying the path loss model to estimate the distance given the
RSS. Section V provides a further discussion on our distance
estimation approach that addresses the above problem.
C. Smartphone and Embedded Sensors
The intimacy of smartphones in our everyday life motivates
us to adopt the smartphone for contact tracing purposes. How-
ever, there are privacy concerns about using such an intimate
device for contact tracing [24]. Many users might worry that
their sensitive information which resides in the smartphone
will be exposed to the public during the contact tracing. Our
introduced SCT uses the non-connectable advertising mode,
hence, none of the neighboring devices are able to connect to
the user’s device to retrieve any information. Furthermore, we
are using a unique environmental signature that contains no
information about the user’s identity.
Research efforts that tried to address this privacy issue
provide better encryption methodologies [15], [16]. However,
none of the works discuss the contact tracing in private
and public locations. While most users might willingly to
participate in contact tracing in the public locations in a hope
to flatten the disease spreading curve, they might feel a bit
uncomfortable to let the contact tracing application running
when they are having their private time in the private location
(e.g., home, sleeping room, car, etc.). Future work can be
conducted using the embedded sensors on the smartphone to
check if the user is in the private or public location. Then, we
can use this information to turn on and turn off the contact
tracing application accordingly.
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Fig. 5: Our proposed SCT system consists of 2 phases: (a) interaction
phase to log the broadcast and observed signature; and (b) tracing
phase to perform the signature matching when a user is diagnosed
with the infected disease.
III. PROPOSED SMART CONTACT TRACING SYSTEM
There are two major phases with our SCT system, as shown
in Fig. 5: the interaction phase and the tracing phase. The
interaction phase focuses on the following two main compo-
nents: 1) privacy-preserving signature protocol, and 2) precise
proximity sensing; whereas the tracing phase aims to provide
an efficient signature matching.
A. Interaction Phase
The interaction phase involves the day to day activities in
public locations, such as workplaces, public transports, grocery
stores, outdoor parks, etc. The contact tracing application starts
automatically when it detects the user is in the public location.
The application executes the following functions:
i. Signature generation: The smartphone scans for the ambi-
ent environmental features. These features are selectively
processed to generate a unique signature that can be fit
into the 31 bytes advertising payload. The signature will
be updated every few minutes.
ii. Signature broadcasting: The smartphone broadcasts the
advertising packet containing the unique signature pe-
riodically according to the advertising interval of Ta.
The packet is broadcasted through the non-connectable
advertising channels.
iii. Signatures Observation: The smartphone scans the three
advertising channels to listen for the advertising packet
broadcast by the neighboring smartphones. The scanning
is performed in between the broadcasting event.
iv. Proximity sensing: The smartphone measures the RSS
values and uses them to estimate how close it is to the
neighboring smartphones. It is assumed to be in proximity
when the distance is less than 2 m.
5v. Physical distancing alert: The smartphone triggers a real-
time alert to warn the user to keep a healthy distance
from nearby users when it detects any physical distancing
violation.
B. Tracing Phase
All the generated signatures and observed signatures will
be stored inside the user’s local storage, as shown in Fig. 5.
Since the signature does not contain any information about
the owner, there is no way for the user to trace or identify the
original owner of the observed signatures. Furthermore, the
signatures are deleted from the local storage permanently once
it is expired. We define the expiration period for each signature
based on the virus spreading timeframe recommended by the
health authorities. For instance, for COVID-19 the expiration
period should be 14 days from the day the signature was
recorded. After 14 days, the corresponding signature will be
deleted.
If a user is diagnosed with an infectious disease, they
can upload all the signatures to the signature database. In
Fig. 5, user A uploaded all his signatures to the signature
database after he became an infected individual. The database
will distribute the signature to all the users’ smartphones.
The signature matching computation is taken placed on each
individual smartphone and a local alert is triggered when there
is a match. The local alert means that the alert is triggered by
the smartphone’s program itself, not the centralized alert sent
by the server. The server is only used to distribute the data.
No program/code is executed on the server to find the close
contact. In this way, we can protect the user from revealing
their identity and to ensure that none of the match cases
can be eavesdropped by malicious hackers. Besides signature
matching, the application also performs the classification to
classify the potential risk of a user according to the time and
distance the user spent with the infected individual.
IV. PRIVACY-PRESERVING SIGNATURE PROTOCOL
While the smartphone can use the non-connectable ad-
vertising mode to refuse any incoming connection request
attempt, we also need to ensure that the packet broadcasting
will not reveal one’s identity. Several methods have been
suggested to protect the user’s identity by using an encrypted
packet [19], [25]. However, these methods require a random
generated secret key that can be compromised. For instance, in
TraceTogether application, a secret key is used to encode the
phone number of the user. If the secret key is hacked, then the
phone number can be retrieved. In this work, we propose to
use the ambient environmental signal to construct a signature
vector that can fit into the advertising packet.
A. Ambient Environmental Features For Signature Generation
When the application starts the contact tracing, it first
generates a signature that can fit into the 31 bytes advertising
packet. The signature is a transformed vector containing the
ambient environmental features. When the smartphone scans
for the packet broadcast by the nearby smartphones, it may
also see other BLE devices. For example, in a grocery store,
the smartphone might see the BLE beacon attached to the
promotional item, the BLE signal from a smartwatch, Apple
pencil, smart thermostat, smart lighting control, etc. The
signal strength of each of these devices observed by a user’s
smartphone is changing depending on the location of the user.
Furthermore, some of these devices (i.e., smartwatch, Apple
pencil) might not always remain at the same location. Let
Pr(d) be a function that returns the time average RSS value
measured from a BLE device located at a certain distance from
smartphone and B = {b1, b2, . . . , bm} be a set of BLE devices
excluding the smartphone used for contact tracing, then the
observed vector can be expressed as follows:
ou(t) = (Pe(db1), Pe(db2), . . . , Pe(dbn))
T (2)
where ou(t) ∈ Rm is an m-dimensional vector observed by a
smartphone of user u at time t. The length of the vector m is
dependent on the size of B.
Rather than truncating the vector when m > 31 or filling the
vector with some arbitrary values when m < 31, we define a
dictionary Ψ ∈ R31×m to transform the m-dimensional vector
to a 31-dimensional vector. This dictionary is also known as
the secret transformation key to the observed vector. We can
define the dictionary as follows:
Ψ =

ψ1,1 ψ1,2 . . . ψ1,m
ψ2,1 ψ2,2 . . . ψ2,m
...
... . . .
...
ψ31,1 ψ31,2 . . . ψ31,m
 . (3)
By multiplying the dictionary with the observed vector, we
obtain our unique signature vector.
Definition 1. (Signature Vector) A signature vector s(t) ∈
R31 can be obtained by a linear combination of column vectors
from Ψ multiplying with the time average RSS value from each
bj in B, i.e.,
s(t) =
∑
bj∈B
ΨjPe(dbj ), (4)
where Ψj = (ψ1,j , ψ2,j , . . . , ψ31,j)T ∈ R31 is the j-th column
vector from the dictionary.
The dictionary for each smartphone is different. If any two
smartphones observe the same ambient features, i.e., similar
time average RSS values from a similar set of BLE devices, the
generated signature vector is still different. Note that the above
case is very rare because even though both persons appear at
the same location at the same time, the RSS values from the
same set of BLE devices might be different due to the receiver
sensitivity of the smartphone, the smartphone’s antenna, the
position and orientation of the smartphone, etc.
B. Scanning and Advertising Activities
Upon the generation of signature, the smartphone encapsu-
lates this signature information into its advertising packet and
broadcasts the packet through the non-connectable advertising
channels. The advertising interval determines the broadcasting
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Fig. 6: Timing diagram for the advertising, scanning and signature
generation activities. All the generated and observed signatures will
be logged in the local database, together with a timestamp τ .
frequency. Suppose that Ta = 100 ms, then we should expect
about 10 packets per second. However, this also depends on
the scanning window and the interval of a smartphone. More
precisely, the smartphone can only see the packet when its
scanning activity overlaps with the advertising activity. The
timing diagram for the advertising, scanning, and signature
generation activities is shown in Fig. 6. Each activity is trig-
gered periodically according to their interval, i.e., generation
interval Tg , advertising interval Ta, and scanning interval Ts.
Given Ts, the smartphone will only stay active to listen for
the incoming packet for a duration defined by the scanning
window Tw.
As shown in Fig. 6, smartphone A fails to receive sB(t1)
from smartphone B, for the first two times since there is
no scanning activity in smartphone A when sB(t1) arrived.
However, smartphone A manages to receive sB(t1) when
smartphone B broadcasts the same packet the third time.
According to [26], the likelihood to see the advertising packet
broadcast by neighboring smartphones is high as long as
Ta < Ts. Intuitively, when the broadcasting frequency is
higher than the scanning frequency given the scanning window
is sufficiently long, then it is likely for one of the broadcast
packets from A meets the scanning windows of B. We can
use a continuous scanning (i.e., set Tw = Ts) to increase
the packet receiving rate. However, such a scanning approach
can greatly affect the energy consumption of a smartphone
and eventually create an adverse effect on a user’s experience.
This work mainly focuses on the privacy and preciseness of
contact tracing, balancing the energy consumption and packet
receiving rate is a possible direction for future work.
The smartphone logs the generated signatures and the ob-
served signatures in its own local storage, as shown in Fig. 6. A
timestamp τ is logged when the smartphone saves a signature
into the local database. We could use either a SQL or NoSQL
approach to construct this database. The logged timestamp is
useful to examine the total time two persons spend in close
proximity to each other. Note that for the observed signature,
we also log the RSS value upon receiving the packet. This
RSS value provides useful information for proximity sensing.
V. PROXIMITY SENSING AND CLASSIFICATION
Proximity sensing has been employed in many scenarios,
including identification of the user’s proximity to museum col-
lection [27], and gallery art pieces [28]. There are also works
study the proximity detection in dense environment [29], or
proximity accuracy with filtering technique [30]. However,
most of these works study the proximity detection between
a human and an object attached to a BLE beacon [31]. There
is no work studying the proximity sensing between the devices
carried by humans.
A. Proximity Sensing with Precise Distance Estimation
We use RSS to infer the distance between any two smart-
phones [32]. Given the RSS value, the distance of a smart-
phone to another smartphone that broadcasts the packet can
be estimated as follows:
d = exp
(
1
n
ln(
1
Pr − c )
)
(5)
where n is the path loss exponent and c is the constant
coefficient. Both n and c can be obtained through least square
fitting.
Given the distance, then we can determine if the user
follows the safe physical distance as recommended by the
health authorities. An alert is sent to remind the user if they
violate the physical distance rule.
In the distance estimation context, accuracy indicates how
close an estimated value to the true value. In other words, the
error between the estimated value and true value is close to
zero for an accurate estimation. Precision, on the other hand,
tells if any two estimated values fall into the same region given
similar measurement input (i.e., the RSS value). For contact
tracing purposes, an accurate distance estimation is not that
critical as compared to precise proximity sensing. We do not
need an accurate estimation to tell if the user is in proximity
to the infected individual. Rather, a precise estimation is more
critical in determining the risk of a user. In particular, we
consider that a user belongs to the high-risk group when the
user is in close proximity (i.e., d ≤ 2m) with the infected
individual, otherwise, the user is considered to be in the low-
risk group.
B. Risk Classification
The problem of classifying the risk of a potential contact
can be modeled as a binary hypothesis test. In particular,
consider a risk mapping function R : (d) −→ {+1,−1},
where +1 indicates high-risk and −1 low-risk, then there
are three hypotheses including the null hypothesis, since we
need to consider also the case of false positive and false
negative. False positive is also known as false alarm, in which
a user actually belongs to the low-risk group, but the system
wrongly classifies them to the high-risk group. False negative,
on the other hand, wrongly classifies the user as the low-risk
group, but they are actually in close proximity to the infected
individual.
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Fig. 7: Miss detection, false positive, and false negative classification.
Let H+ denote the hypothesis that the user belongs to the
high-risk (+1) group and H− the hypothesis that the user
belongs to the low-risk (−1), then the possible hypotheses
are:
H0 : R(d) = 0
H+ : R(d) = +1
H− : R(d) = −1
(6)
where R(d) = 0 means that the user is not in contact with the
infected individual. This is valid when the signature matching
returns null, which means the user did not encounter any
infected individual.
Let h, l, and a be the ground truth label for high-risk,
low-risk and absence (i.e., the user is not in contact with the
infected individual, then:
True positive : P (H+|h)
True negative : P (H0|a)
False positive : P (H+|a) + P (H+|l)
False negative : P (H−|a) + P (H−|h)
Miss detection : P (H0|h) + P (H0|l)
(7)
The possible classification outcomes given the above hy-
potheses are illustrated in Fig. 7. It is obvious that miss
detection is undesirable because the user might be at risk
but the system considers the user is safe. False negative
misclassified the high-risk user to low-risk, but in comparison
to miss detection, it can at least detect the user. However, this
may give a wrong impression to the user that the possibility
for them to get infected is low, but actually the possibility
could be high. False positive misclassified the low-risk user
to high-risk. Even though it is a bit conservative to alarm the
user that they are most likely to get infected while they may
not, this is a relatively safer outcome than miss detection and
false negative.
VI. IMPLEMENTATION AND EXPERIMENTS
We have developed a smartphone application to demonstrate
our proposed SCT. The application has the following two
functions: 1) contact tracing based on the privacy-preserving
signature protocol, and 2) physical distancing alert based on
precise proximity sensing. We describe our experimental setup
and then discuss our experimental results by comparing the
performance with another five classifiers, i.e., decision tree
(DT), linear discriminant analysis (LDA), naive bayes (NB), k
nearest neighbors (kNN), and support vector machine (SVM).
𝑑𝑑
a
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Fig. 8: For the experimental purpose, we created another version of
the application by (a) adding a manual button to control the start
and the end of the experiment, (b) an input field to key in the truth
distance measured through the measuring tape, and (c) a save button
that save the measurement data.
A. Application Development
We built an Android Application to demonstrate the func-
tionalities of our proposed SCT. First, the application generates
a signature packet according to the privacy-preserving signa-
ture protocol. Then, it pushes an alert notification when the
user violates the physical distancing rule. All the generated
signatures, observed signatures, and their corresponding sig-
nal strengths are all stored in the smartphone’s storage. We
installed the application into Android smartphones, including
Nokia 8.1 with Android 10, HTC M9 with Android 7.0
Nougat. At least API 23 is required for the BLE to operate.
According to Google, at least 95% of smartphones support
API 23. If a user has a lower API version, then they can still
use the application, however, only to receive BLE signals.
Other IoT devices, such as BLE beacons can be used from
these users to enable them to transmit signals [33]. When
running the application the power requirement is less than
0.24 W which is negligible. For experimental purposes, we
created another version of the application that allows us to
log the ground truth during the experiment, in order to be
able and compare the estimation with the real data.
B. Experimental Setting
For experimental purposes, the application that allows us
to log the ground truth was used. We use the ground truth
to evaluate the classification performance. The following in-
formation is logged: the truth distance, name of smartphone,
MAC address of BLE chipset, the packet payload, RSS values,
time elapsed, and timestamp. The time elapsed indicates the
time difference between the previous broadcast packet and
the current broadcast packet, whereas the timestamp is the
exact time when the smartphone received the packet. The
true distance is measured with a measuring tape during the
experiment, as shown in Fig. 8.
In this experiment, both users are required to hold the
smartphone on their hand while doing the measurement.
However, the position of the hand is not fixed, and the user
can randomly hold the smartphone according to their own
comfort. The Android BLE API only provides three possible
8TABLE I: Advertising interval provided by Android BLE API.
Mode Ta
ADVERTISE MODE LOW LATENCY 100ms
ADVERTISE MODE BALANCED 250ms
ADVERTISE MODE LOW POWER 1000ms
TABLE II: Statistical Descriptions of Experimental Data.
Distance (m) Count mean(Pr) var(Pr)
0.2 1548 -58.9994 48.8203
0.4 1203 -62.9967 9.8685
0.6 934 -70.3084 10.7666
0.8 1080 -74.3167 16.6930
1.0 1631 -79.3476 14.3153
1.2 1573 -74.7788 12.7322
1.4 3986 -80.6468 41.5620
1.6 1282 -89.6599 11.8577
1.8 1344 -79.4903 4.8413
2.0 1101 -80.1835 15.0263
3.0 886 -82.1704 16.0150
4.0 1220 -88.5475 10.7254
5.0 2115 -90.4591 38.0261
advertising interval settings, as shown in Table I. In our
experiment, the application is configured to advertise at a
“ADVERTISE MODE LOW LATENCY”. The application is
initiated to start the scan when the user presses the scan
button. The scan will continue until the user press the button
again. We repeated the experiment for distance from 0.2 m
to 2.0 m (with 0.2 m increment each step), and 3 m to 5 m
(with 1 m increment each step). Hence, there are a total of
13 distance points where the measurement is conducted. For
each distance, the application was running for at least 60 s.
All the measurement data are saved into a “comma-separated
values” (.csv) file format and are exported to Matlab for further
experiments.
C. Data Preprocessing
There are a total of 19,903 data points collected. The
statistical descriptions of our experimental data are shown in
Table II. We can see that the variance is high at some distance
points. This is mostly due to the multipath effects, in which
the signal takes multiple paths to reach the receiver. At the
receiving end, the signals might be added up constructively or
destructively, resulting in many different RSS measurements
even the distance is the same. Furthermore, the reflection
by moving objects in practical environments might cause
undesirable outliers.
To mitigate the possible outlier, we apply a moving average
filter to the raw data. A comparison between the raw RSS data
with the filtered data, for d ={0.2, 1, 2, 3, 5} m is shown
in Fig. 9. It is clear that the filtered data provides a much
smoother signal. However, there are still variations in signal
strength even though the distance is the same. In practice,
it is hard to obtain only line-of-sight (LOS) signal in indoor
environments due to the reflection and diffraction of the signal.
Extracting multipath profile features to achieve better distance
estimation could be a possible future direction.
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Fig. 9: The raw RSS data vs. the filtered RSS data computed through
moving average.
D. Experimental Results
We applied a non-linear least square fitting to determine
the value for coefficients n and c, in Eq. (5). We used the
mean RSS described in Table II as the dependent variable and
distance as the independent variable. Using this fitted path
loss model, we can then estimate the distance by feeding the
RSS value measured at each time step into the model. The
ultimate goal is to classify if the user belongs to the high-risk
or low-risk group assuming the other user is infected with the
disease. Based on the physical distancing rule recommended
by the Canada Health authority [34], we classify the user as
high-risk if the estimated distance is ≤ 2m and low-risk if
the estimated distance is > 2m.
We compared the fitted path loss model with five machine
learning-based classifiers: DT, LDA, NB, kNN, and SVM.
We separated the measurement data into 80% training data
and 20% testing data. The input RSS was encoded into an
8-bit binary feature. We used confusion matrix to evaluate
the performance of each classifier, as shown in Fig. 10.
Overall, DT method achieves the highest accuracy, i.e., 82.9%.
However, if we examined the matrix, we can see that DT also
produces a very high false negative rate, i.e., it incorrectly
classifies the high-risk group as low-risk for 10.5%. This is not
a desirable result for contact tracing purposes because those
in the high-risk group are those people that are very likely to
get infected but DT method classified them as low-risk. On the
other hand, both NB and kNN have a higher false positive rate,
i.e., 21.2%. This is relatively acceptable as it is rather to be
more conservative than to be ignored. While the overall results
are acceptable, there is still room for improvement. Instead
of using the raw measurement, we compared the results with
preprocess data. Furthermore, we would like to understand
how the distancing threshold affects accuracy.
1) Implications of Filtered Window: As shown in Fig. 9, we
can mitigate the possible outliers by preprocessing the data.
Note that Fig. 9 is obtained by applying the moving average
with window size equals to 10. We further examine the effect
of window size on the risk classification performance, and the
results are shown in Fig. 11. It is clear that DT achieves the
best performance in comparison to the other approaches when
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Fig. 10: The classification performance of each method is evaluated via a confusion matrix. The x-axis represents the ground truth, whereas
the y-axis is the predicted output. The accuracy can be computed by averaging the diagonal elements of the matrix.
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Fig. 12: The performance gain in percentage.
the window size increases. However, NB does not show any
performance gain with increased window size. LDA, on the
other hand, starts to show fluctuation when the window size
increases. This could be due to overfitting during the training
process. Overall, we see that the performance starts to saturate
when the window size is more than 100. The performance
gain with respect to window size is shown in Fig. 12. The
performance gain is computed by subtracting the accuracy
obtained by the filtered RSS with the accuracy obtained by
the raw RSS and then divided by the accuracy obtained by
the raw RSS. From Fig. 12, we can see that PL is the one that
has benefited from the filtered RSS, in which it has higher
performance gain than the rest. In particular, we see that the
accuracy obtained via PL is increased from 79.6% to 83.36%,
which is corresponding to 4.68% performance gain. However,
not all the methods are benefited from the filtered RSS. Some
methods show a performance drop when the window size
increases, for example, SVM. Even though DT and LDA
can achieve better performance than PL model, both of these
methods require extensive training and the accuracy may drop
when there are not sufficient data for training.
2) Implications of Physical Distancing Threshold: As dis-
cussed previously, our SCT system classifies the contact to
high-risk or low-risk according to the physical distancing
rule recommended by the health authority. While we might
incorrectly classify the high-risk contact to low-risk due to the
fluctuation of the RSS value, we observed that the classifica-
tion accuracy, in fact, increases when the distancing threshold
is smaller. This is preferable as we would definitely like to
classify the user as high-risk when the user is very close
to the infected person. We plotted the accuracy score for
different distance thresholds for PL, DT, and LDA. These three
methods are selected because they show a good performance,
as discussed previously. We compared the accuracy score
between raw data and filtered data, by setting the window
size to 100. This window size is selected based on the
window effect on the accuracy score discussed previously.
The accuracy is high when the distancing threshold is less
than 1 m, as shown in Fig. 13. This result ensures that the
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Fig. 13: The effect of distance thresholds (i.e., the distance rule used to classify the high-risk and low-risk contact) on the accuracy.
system might produce some false negative, but this is mostly
happening to the group of users with distance in between 1 m
to 2 m from the infected individual. Interestingly, we also
see that the accuracy increases when the distance threshold is
increased from 1.5 m to 2 m. This indicates that the system
is a bit conservative, in which it tends to classify the user as
high-risk when the distancing threshold is more than 1.5 m.
Overall, it is safer to have high false positive than high false
negative especially if the virus is very contagious.
E. Effect of Smartphone’s Positions on the Body
We extended the experiment to investigate the proximity
sensing performance in connection to the positions of smart-
phone on the body. The reason is that the user might not carry
the smartphone on their hand most of the time. When they
are walking on the street or doing grocery shopping, the user
might either carry the phone on their hand, put their phone on
their pocket or backpack. As shown in Fig. 14, we consider
additional five cases on top of the “Hand-to-Hand (HH)” case
discussed previously. All the measurement data collected from
all these six cases can be found in IEEE Dataport [10] and
Github [11]. There are a total of 123,718 data points, in which
HH contributes 19,903 data points. The additional five cases
and their total data points are listed as follows:
• Hand-to-Pocket (HP): one user carries the phone on
his/her hand and another user keeps the phone in their
pocket. There are a total of 16,081 data points collected
for this case.
• Hand-to-Backpack (HB): one user carries the phone on
his/her hand and another user keeps the phone inside their
backpack. There are a total of 10,330 data points collected
for this case.
• Pocket-to-Backpack (PB): one user keeps the phone in
the pocket and another user keeps the phone inside their
backpack. There are a total of 19,161 data points collected
for this case.
• Pocket-to-Pocket (PP): both users keep their phones in
their pockets. There are a total of 24,151 data points
collected for this case.
• Backpack-to-Backpack (BB): both users keep their
phones in their backpacks. There are a total of 34,092
data points collected for this case.
Previously, we have verified that the accuracy in distance
estimation did affect the classification performance. Hence, we
examine the distance estimation performance for all the five
cases above. In particular, we used the mean absolute error
(a) HH (b) HP (c) HB
(d) PB (e) PP (f) BB
Fig. 14: The six combinations of smartphone positions.
(MAE) to compute the error between the estimated distance
and the ground truth distance.
The CDF of the distance estimation errors for all the six
cases is plotted, as shown in Fig. 15. It is obvious that the
filtered data achieves a better performance. The window size
100 is selected based on the justification provided in Fig. 11.
From the CDF, we can see that, for 80% of the time, the error
is less than 1.27 m for HH case, 0.76 m HP case, 3.93 m HB
case, 14.94 m PB case, 1.79 m PP case, and 1.48 m BB case.
We observe that PB has the worst performance. This can be
explained by the fact that the signals from both smartphones
were suffered through different paths of attenuation. Hence,
even though we tried to calibrate the model based on the
environmental factor, the model is unable to capture such
variations. For HH, PP, and BB cases, the signals from both
sides might suffer similar path of attenuation. Take the BB
case for example, the smartphone observed a signal blocked
by a human body since the smartphone on the other side was
located inside the backpack. Similarly, the smartphone on the
other side also observed similar signal blocked by another
human body. Hence, as long as both smartphones measure
the signal from similar position, it is most likely to produce a
good estimation.
We also examine the classification performances for all
these six cases. Table III shows the classification accuracy
obtained using the raw data and the filtered data. From the
table, we can see that DT achieves the best performance
with more than 81% accuracy for all the cases. Compared
to the classification based on distance estimation, the machine
learning based is more robust to the signal variations caused
by body shadowing. Rather than estimating the distance, these
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Fig. 15: The CDF of the distance estimation errors for all the six cases.
TABLE III: Classification Accuracy for all the six cases
Case Method Raw Data Filtered DataMean 95% Confidence Interval Mean 95% Confidence Interval
HH
DT 82.90% (82.77%, 85.64%) 85.82% (83.00%, 85.83%)
LDA 82.12% (82.02%, 85.01%) 85.13% (82.23%, 85.21%)
NB 78.79% (78.68%, 78.79%) 78.89% (78.89%, 78.89%)
kNN 78.81% (78.66%, 81.35%) 81.53% (78.96%, 81.63%)
SVM 78.46% (78.45%, 78.51%) 78.55% (78.64%, 78.66%)
PL 79.62% (79.63%, 83.38%) 83.79% (79.63%, 83.38%)
HP
DT 82.80% (82.69%, 90.67%) 90.75% (82.90%, 90.84%)
LDA 82.17% (82.04%, 90.16%) 90.19% (82.30%, 90.33%)
NB 80.27% (80.14%, 81.71%) 81.81% (80.40%, 81.98%)
kNN 81.84% (81.70%, 86.95%) 87.15% (81.97%, 87.18%)
SVM 18.13% (18.00%, 79.14%) 79.27% (18.26%, 79.39%)
PL 77.92% (77.92%, 85.34%) 85.34% (77.92%, 85.34%)
HB
DT 77.04% (76.87%, 81.29%) 81.44% (77.20%, 81.60%)
LDA 76.99% (76.82%, 78.68%) 78.85% (77.16%, 79.02%)
NB 76.70% (76.55%, 76.55%) 76.70% (76.86%, 76.86%)
kNN 76.92% (76.75%, 77.82%) 77.99% (77.10%, 78.16%)
SVM 23.22% (23.06%, 23.06%) 23.22% (23.38%, 23.38%)
PL 23.31% (23.31%, 23.33%) 23.33% (23.31%, 23.33%)
PB
DT 87.01% (87.02%, 87.45%) 87.51% (87.16%, 87.58%)
LDA 87.01% (87.02%, 87.02%) 87.01% (87.18%, 87.18%)
NB 87.12% (87.05%, 87.05%) 87.13% (87.21%, 87.21%)
kNN 87.03% (86.96%, 86.96%) 87.03% (87.10%, 87.10%)
SVM 86.62% (86.54%, 83.45%) 83.53% (86.69%, 83.61%)
PL 56.38% (56.38%, 60.37%) 60.37% (56.38%, 60.37%)
PP
DT 73.35% (73.12%, 87.18%) 87.26% (73.47%, 87.34%)
LDA 72.94% (72.82%, 87.13%) 87.23% (73.47%, 87.34%)
NB 71.34% (71.22%, 73.77%) 73.90% (73.07%, 87.33%)
kNN 71.41% (71.29%, 73.79%) 73.91% (71.47%, 74.02%)
SVM 28.60% (28.48%, 29.54%) 28.60% (28.72%, 29.54%)
PL 66.52% (66.52%, 77.34%) 77.34% (66.52%, 77.34%)
BB
DT 77.36% (77.26%, 90.78%) 90.85% (77.45%, 90.91%)
LDA 76.90% (76.81%, 85.21%) 85.28% (76.99%, 85.36%)
NB 76.93% (76.85%, 85.18%) 85.25% (77.02%, 85.32%)
kNN 77.16% (77.07%, 78.00%) 78.09% (77.26%, 78.19%)
SVM 22.94% (22.85%, 69.34%) 69.44% (23.02%, 69.54%)
PL 62.18% (62.18%, 73.28%) 73.28% (62.18%, 73.28%)
classifiers tried to memorize the output given the labeled
input during the training process. Hence, the amount of data
and the validity of data during the training is very important
to train a good classifier. In general, the machine learning
approach can be adopted when there are sufficient training
data available, otherwise, the PL model is the best choice for
instant proximity sensing.
The accuracy of the PL model increases when the time
duration users spent in contact increases, as shown in Fig. 16.
In general, when the duration increases, the smartphone will
be able to observe more signals that help to produce better
distance estimation and increase the classification accuracy.
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Fig. 16: The accuracy obtained over time.
However, the accuracy starts to saturate after 10 s for most
of the cases except HB case. This result indicates that the
smartphone has already observed sufficient RSS data for
making the most accurate distance estimation when the time
duration is at least 10 s. The accuracy of the HB case, on the
other hand, drops when the time duration increases. Since the
signals arrive at two smartphones from different attenuation
paths, the more signals the smartphone observes, the more
confusing the smartphone in making a correct estimation. Note
that both HB and PB cases converge to the same accuracy
score when the time duration increases. It is clear that the
varying attenuation paths due to the position of smartphones
on different body positions can severely affect accuracy. Future
work can be conducted to study the effect of attenuation paths
from both sides and come up with an adaptive path loss model
that can cater to such diversity in attenuation paths.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
Contact tracing is an essential measure in containing the
further spread of a highly infected disease. We propose a
smart contact tracing (SCT) system that can provide precise
proximity sensing and classify the risk of encountered contact
while providing a privacy-preserving signature protocol. From
the experimental results, we verified that a BLE- based system
for contact tracing is a prominent solution for epidemic control
and prevention. Our SCT system offers tangible results of
using RSS values for proximity sensing between two human
beings. We have also shared the dataset in an open-source
repository to encourage further research.
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